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Jonathan linger
Ronald Dore's The Diploma Disease [1976] has
shown convincingly how the educational systems
of many of the Third World countries have been
distorted by the desperate desires of their students
to win modern sector jobs. As the school system
expands, ever higher educational credentials
become necessary to obtain such jobs, and the
reputations of schools and the careers of teachers
can become increasingly dependent upon their
students' rate of success in getting through higher-
school entrance examinations. In much of the
Third World, as Dore points out, the end results
can be crippling. Students spend years in a rote
cramming that will have little relation to their
own later lives; the contest to climb the school
ladder implicitly teaches them to view the most
common occupations of their society with disdain;
and most of them are then consigned to those
very occupations as 'failures'.
In the 1960s, China's school structure somewhat
resembled the educational structures of other
late-developing countries. Entrance examinations
helped determine which of the students were able
to enter each higher level of education; the com-
petition among students was tight; and many
Chinese high schools, especially in the cities, com-
peted to attain a high university entrance rate.
Success in this earned the school a high reputa-
tion. (The important exceptions to this competi-
tion, as we shall later observe, were the voca-
tional schools.)
In the aftermath of the 1966-68 Cultural Revolu-
tion, China's 'radicals' (that is, Mao and the
group that is now pejoratively called the Gang
of Four) destroyed this earlier school structure.
Their principal motive was to provide better
opportunities to young people from proletarian
families. Since the children of the old pre-
revolution intelligentsia and merchants were
among the best students, the examination system
had favoured them. Thus all examinations that
sorted and stratified students were to be abolished.
Schooling was to be restructured so as to level
out the gaps between students from different
backgrounds. To promote this, after 1968 in
major cities like Canton, education was supplied
to all youths through senior high school.
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(Financially this was made possible by shortening
the entire school curriculum by two years.) Then,
so as to sever entirely the links between classroom
achievements and upward mobility, all the young
people graduating from high school were assigned
directly to jobs, with no account taken of their
academic records when devising these job post-
ings. The choice of which young people could
go on to higher schooling was left to the places
of work, purportedly on the basis of a young
worker's performance on his job.
Though this new scheme's intent was primarily
to improve the chances of working class children,
these radical changes were similar to those Dore
has put forward as a possible remedy for the
'diploma disease' [Dore 1975: 142-53]. But the
programme as practised in China proved unwork-
able. Between 1968 and Mao's death in 1976,
most of China's urban' students simply stopped
paying attention in class,
Admittedly, when this new structure of education
was introduced in 1968, China's urban schools
faced enormous problems that would have
hampered any educational venture. Students had
been running loose on the streets during the two
chaotic years of the Cultural Revolution, and the
schools were having difficulty getting them
readjusted to the routine of school life. The
teaching profession was demoralised; the text-
books were haphazardly devised; and the curri-
culum was subjected to exceedingly narrow
ideological constraints. In fact, many of the
schools initially played it safe by having their
students concentrate solely on memorising Mao
quotes [Unger forthcoming].
But by the 1970s, China provided a somewhat
better test case of whether it is feasible to divorce
education from the contest for careers. Though
China's schools still faced grave administrative
problems, the turmoil and confusion of the
Cultural Revolution was receding into memory;
the textbooks were no longer heavily burdened
1 To avoid misunderstanding, note the qualification in the
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with political rhetoric; the coursework was con-
siderably better organised. Yet students continued
to play truant, and many of them continued to
be rowdy. A former student from Fujian Pro-
vince who graduated from senior high school in
1973 and was assigned to a temporary job as a
'monitor' in one of his own school's junior high
classes remembers:
These younger kids' attitudes toward study
were even worse than my own class's. lt was
really chaotic in the class. Each classroom had
two or three of us monitors, but it made little
difference; the kids yelled and horsed around
even when the teacher was trying to teach.
They didn't know why the heck they were in
class. They said studying's useless because their
level of achievement wouldn't have any rela-
tionship with their futures. / got to know a
girl there, whose dad's in the Foreign Ministry
and who was a good and willing student. ¡
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asked her why, and it turned out she felt she'd
have the opportunity to enter a university,
through her father. The teacher kept on telling
the other kids 'study to construct the country'.
Some students were willing to, partly because
they also happened to be interested in studying.
Most were unwilling.
The same point consistently re-emerged in the
interviews, which were conducted in Hong Kong
during 1975-76 with nine former students and five
former high school teachers from China.2 Every
one of them insisted that most students had felt
it 'useless to study' because success or failure at
their schoolwork would have no bearing on their
futures.
At the very same time, though, many students
were worried about their futures. In China, as
in many other late-developing countries, industrial
expansion had not kept pace with the baby boom.
To avoid high levels of urban unemployment
China had begun assigning growing numbers of
the new high school graduates to work indefinitely
in the .countryside. But most of the young people
tried to avoid going [Unger 1979]. Among other
things, they sensed that the peasant villages had
become a dumping grounds for the cities' 'losers'.
To help dispel this feeling, the authorities decided
that the system of career assignments had to
become patently impartial and equitable. Each
city devised its own programme, but Canton's
was fairly typical. In 1971 it was proclaimed in
Canton that any graduating student would be
allocated to a rural job, if half or more of his or
her brothers and sisters were still in the city.
That meant basically that elder siblings went to
the countryside, and the younger children in each
family got the urban jobs.
The 'backwash' into the schools from this job-
assignment policy was profound. Once the
students felt their futures were already fated by
the order of their births, those destined for the
countryside became even less inclined to open
their books. They argued to their teachers they
would only be able to utilise very rudimentary
skills in the villages, Why pay attention to mathe-
matics beyond the multiplication tables when
rural accounting techniques used no maths
beyond that? Why bother even to learn to
recognise rural pests or how to plant rice when
they would be learning that anyway once they
2 All but three of these 14 interviewees were legal emigrants.
Some were Chinese from Southeast Asia who had returned
to China with their families in the l950s and early 1960s
and had recently come hack out again through Hong Kong.
Others were Hong Kong residents whose parents had sent
them to Socialist China for their education.
Iwere peasants? It was partly that they felt little
preparation was needed for the countryside. But
it was partly also, according to respondents, that
students did not want to lead the hard and poor
life of a peasant. They were consequently refusing
to orient themselves toward such a future while
still at school. In class some of them openly
vented their frustrations and resentments. The
final year of senior high school was 'the worst
class to try to control', observed a high school
teacher from Yunnan Province: 'when kids are
imminently facing settlement in the countryside,
sometimes on purpose they'll sabotage the class
period'.
Students who were heading for urban postings
were less obstreperous, but only slightly more
prone to give any attention to their schoolwork.
For one thing, few of them even contemplated
going on to a university education. Word had
circulated that without entrance examinations or
other standardised means for selecting the new
university students, Party officials had begun pull-
ing strings and making use of old boy networks.
They were getting their children out of the
countryside by getting rural officials to nominate
the child for a university seat. According to a
former Shanghai high school teacher, the young
people from other family backgrounds no longer
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saw any possibility of their own further educa-
tion, 'just like people don't even think about
whether it would be nice or not to live on the
moon'.
Many students, even from the intelligentsia only
wanted blue collar work. The students were
aware that a worker in the early and mid l970s
held a relatively secure political status at a time
when 'intellectuals' were politically vulnerable and
sometimes harassed. The new desirability and
improved status of industrial employment
encouraged a growing interest among the students
in modern mechanical crafts. This was even true
in fact, especially trueof young people fated
for rural assignments, probably because such
hobbies represented the type of urban jobs they
desired but would not be getting. Students who
generally gave little attention to school-work
often gravitated, out of school, toward radio
building, woodworking, model plane building and
the like. At the Fuljan school, where these skills
could he practised in 'hobby groups', the interest
of students was so great that the school was able
to get some of the students to behave better by
denying participation to any students who were
rowdy during regular classtime.
Some of the students who would be staying in the
city had their own reasons for pursuing such
hobbies. As part of the new school curriculum,
they had engaged in work stints at factories, and
interviewees say they and their classmates had
become aware of the monotony of routine pro-
duction line work. In reaction, the hobbies
reportedly reflected a desire for interesting blue
collar work, such as shop floor mechanics and
the like.
The students' views had become more utilitarian
in many respects than the school systemand
many young people rejected school on these very
grounds. They were refusing for pragmatic
reasons to pay attention to most of their classes,
while at the same time wanting more modern
craft skills than they could obtain at school. The
radicals who until 1976 were in charge of educa-
tion had mixed feelings about encouraging desires
for even this type of expertise. They felt such an
educational orientation was linked to inegalitarian
social values. Before the Cultural Revolution, as
they pointed out in newspaper editorials, a high
regard for expertise had propped up the prestige
and salaries of the old professionally trained
'petty bourgeois' classes.
But the Chinese leadership was split. The
scientific and military establishments and the
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economic planners were increasingly alarmed at
the absence of a new generation of technicians
and scientific personnel. They were convinced
that all of the radicals' prescriptions for
secondary and higher education were endanger-
ing China's future [Unger 19801. After Mao's
death in 1976, the new leadership that took power
accordingly moved quickly to overturn almost
all the innovations in education that had been
ushered in with the Cultural Revolution. As
officials told a recent visitor in explanation, 'the
[radicals'] remedy may have been curing the
disease, but it was killing the patient' [Smerling
19791. The competitive school ladder has been
reintroduced, with entrance examinations for
junior and senibr high school as well as univer-
sity. The new structure stresses academic 'talent'
even more than the pre-Cultural Revolution
system; the high schools, for example, have
begun tracking students into different classrooms
on the basis of their academic achievements.
China's newspapers recently have been reporting
that many of the symptoms of the diploma
disease have already re-appeared: the after-
school private tutors, rote digestion of school
material, schools sponsoring weekend 'cramming'
sessions, ambitious students exhausting themselves.
Lessons
What can be learned from China's experiences?
It might have been hoped that, if an educational
system could be divorced from the competition
for careers and if the threat of selection examina-
tions were removed, students would be better able
52
to learn for intrinsic reasons, such as the
practicality of the schoolwork.
But this study induced little optimism about the
possibilities for wholesale reforms. Admittedly,
even in China's mismanaged school system of
1968-76, many students did focus their attention
upon modern craft skills, and to an extent
greater than the schools encouraged. But it must
also be recognised that the social status, political
prestige and economic security of China's
industrial workers were, all in all, probably
higher at that time than the prestige and security
of engineers and technicians. It was a situation
unlike any other country and temporary even in
China, soon to be overthrown along with the
Gang of Four. These students, in short, were
interested in the skills for desirable jobs; the
same students neglected to pay attention to the
school lessons on farming. Circumscribing their
opportunities had not made them any more
satisfied with the low-status occupations, nor
oriented them more toward learning the skills
involved. If even China, with a national political
ideology that actively promoted the dignity of
farm work, could not persuade urban students
destined for the countryside to pay attention to
learning agricultural skills at school, how might
other countries expect to promote a similar type
of vocational coursework?
In short, educational reforms will not succeed if
they ignore students' anxieties and hopes about
climbing into desired careers. But there are many
partial reforms that Third World nations can
employ which realistically recognise students' job
aspirations but at the same time come to grips
with some of the diploma disease's ill effects
[eg Dore 1976: 152-631.
China employed an intermediate solution of this
type very successfully prior to the Cultural
Revolution. China's urban vocational school pro-
gramme in the 1950s and l960s was linked to
the job market in a way that encouraged the
learning of actual vocational skills. The voca-
tional schools' singular advantage was their
ability to channel vocational graduates directly
into reserved jobs. Unlike China's academic-track
senior high schools, whose graduates had to
scramble on their own to find jobs, the vocational
system in the 1950s and l960s was able to
assign its graduates to be the new book-keepers
for government offices and factories, the new
marine pilots, locomotive engineers, machine-shop
craftsmen, etc. These vocational schools' annual
enrolments were geared to the projected man-
power needs of the various industries and govern-
ment units; this was to ensure that there would
not be any shortages of new skilled personnel.
The results of the programme were impressive.
Though the most achievement-oriented urban
students in the l950s and 1960s continued to
gamble on the academic-track senior high schools
in the hope of getting into a university, in 1965
Canton's full time vocational schools held fully
80 per cent as many students as the academic-
track senior high school system; and the com-
petition to get admitted was fairly tight. Most
of these vocational students were purposely made
ineligible to take the university entrance examina-
tions, so as to prevent them from turning their
studies back toward 'examination prepping'. The
vocational school administrators very likely sup-
ported this regulation, since they were under
pressure to supply the government organs with
adequately trained personnel.
From 1968 to 1976, however, the doors of many
of these vocational schools were closed.3 As a
recent complaint in China's press observes:
3 Under the radicals' scheme, the vocational schools no longer
operated as secondary schools. Instead, if a factory needed
improved manpower skills of a given kind, it was supposed
to select several young workers to attend the appropriate
vocational programme. After graduating, the workers were
to return to the factory. The municipal education depart-
ments, however, had run into great difficullies finding
enough classrooms and teachers for the new universalised
ten year school programme. With this priority in mind,
they converted many of the former vocational school
facilities into regular schools in t1e late 1960s. The radicals'
vocational training scheme was crippled from the start.
Since the Cultural Revolution the ordinary
senior high schools blindly have been allowed
to expand, and the secondary level specialist
schools and the various vocational schools have
largely stopped operating. This type of one-
sided development has [meant that] . . each
year the number of senior high graduates is
extremely large, and so the ratio of students
which the higher educational institutions can
admit is very small. This [presently] not only
has created a lot of pressure on the institutes
of higher education, but also pressures on the
senior high to pursue [compete for] favourable
rates of university admissions. Even more note-
worthy is that over 90 per cent of the senior
high graduates will have to participate in
manual labour; but they do not have vocational
preparation, which gives rise to an acute
demand for skilled labour power.
(Guangming Daily, 5 July 1979: 4)
It now appears China's earlier successful pro-
gramme will be resurrected in its entirety.
Such an approach to vocational schooling would
probably be of considerable benefit to other late
developing countries, too. Third World govern-
ments normally employ a substantial portion of
the personnel in the modern sector. Yet these
governments' personnel officers all too frequently
operate on the premise that the less capable
students are obliged to enter the vocational track,
and they accordingly prefer hiring the general
education graduates instead. Probably more than
anything else, it is this which defeats vocational
programmes. In some of these countries, voca-
tional students reportedly do not concentrate on
their vocational courses but instead 'prep' to pass
the regular-track entrance examinations.
If these Third World governments' regulations
stipulated that specified categories of their new
middle level technical, administrative, or even
blue collar government workers were only to be
hired from among the graduates of the appro-
priate vocational schools, the vocational students
could be expected to turn their attention back
towards their vocational courses. Perhaps even
more important, students in the lower schools
would be likely to show a greater interest in
learning the various skills useful for getting into
vecational studies.
There may be no complete solution to the
diploma disease. But the Chinese vocational train-
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